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Abstract
In liberalized network industries, competitors can either compete for ser-
vice using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own capacity
(bypass). We revisit this make-or-buy problem making two contributions to
the literature. First we analyze both the profit maximizing behavior of an
incumbent and the welfare maximizing behavior when the entrant chooses
between access and bypass. Second, we extend the baseline model studied in
the literature by allowing for fixed costs of network installation. By analogy
to the literature on strategic entry deterrence, we distinguish three re´gimes
of blockaded bypass, deterred bypass and accommodated bypass depending
on the entrant’s unit cost. We show that the make-or-buy decision of the
entrant is not necessarily technologically efficient: when bypass is chosen, it
is always the cheapest option but access may be chosen when it is not cost
effective.
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In liberalized network industries, competitors can choose between service-
based and facility-based competition. In the former case, competing firms
offer retail products and services using the incumbent’s installed infrastruc-
ture for which they pay an access fee (the “buy”or “access”option). In the
latter case, firms develop their own infrastructure to compete on the retail
market (the “make”or “bypass”option). This choice between access and by-
pass is illustrated by the broadband service market where the two modes
of competition currently coexist. In countries where access to the incum-
bent’s DSL network is mandatory rival firms either supply services on the
incumbent’s network or develop their own platform (cable TV network, fiber
network, wireless) to provide broadband services to consumers.1
When the cost of building an alternative network is large, incumbents
have an incentive to deny access in order to block entry of competitors.2
Faced with this risk of market foreclosure, regulators have taken steps to
mandate access to the network of the historical operator and guarantee ac-
cess at a reasonable price. This regulatory policy which originated in the
1990s – and is still prevalent in Europe – has evolved in the face of increasing
competition among network operators, due to a convergence between tech-
nologies and a the development of new generation access networks. In the
United States, the FCC has lifted in 2003 most of the regulations imposed
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, maintaining access obligations for
the legacy copper networks but lifting them for new infrastructures. In
Europe, mandatory access and regulated access prices continue to be im-
posed but only if the incumbent operator holds significant market power
on the wholesale broadband market.3 In 2006, virtually all countries found
the incumbent operator to hold significant market power on the wholesale
broadband market and imposed some form of regulation (Schwartz, 2007)
but more recently, with the development of competition, regulations have
started to be lightened or even removed.4 In the future, it is expected that
regulation of network infrastructures will be partially removed both in the
1While we cast our analysis in the framework of network industries, it covers more
generally any situation where a vertically integrated incumbent faces an entrant who can
choose to make an input or buy it from the incumbent.
2See Laffont and Tirole (1994).
3See Marcus (2005) and Vogelsang (2013) for a discussion of the evolution of regulatory
policy in the US and Europe.
4For example, in the UK, the regulator OFCOM has decided that some local broadband
markets are sufficiently competitive for access regulations to be lifted.
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EU and in the US (Vogelsang, 2013) though there are exceptions.5
Our objective in this paper is to shed light on the use of (and the ne-
cessity to use) regulatory instruments in network industries. We revisit the
literature on access in network industries by comparing technological and
economic efficiency in regulated and unregulated markets. Our contribution
to the literature is twofold. First we analyze both the profit maximizing
behavior of an incumbent and the welfare maximizing behavior when the
entrant chooses between access and bypass. Second, we extend the base-
line model studied in the literature by allowing for fixed costs of network
installation.
We study how an unregulated incumbent manipulates access prices in
order to deter bypass by the incoming firm. By analogy with the literature
on entry deterrence (Tirole, 1988) we identify three re´gimes: accommo-
dated bypass, deterred bypass and blockaded bypass and we characterize
the threshold cost levels that separate the three re´gimes.6
Our analysis revolves around the limit access charge – the maximal access
charge under which the entrant prefers to access the incumbent’s network
than to bypass. If the limit access charge is too low and induces large losses
on the access market, the incumbent prefers to let the entrant construct an
alternative network (re´gime of accommodated bypass). If the limit access
charge is higher than the profit maximizing level, the incumbent blocks
bypass without distorting the access charge (re´gime of blockaded bypass).
For intermediate values of the limit access charge, the incumbent sets access
charges at the limit access charge level in order to deter bypass (re´gime of
deterred bypass). The limit access charge may be lower than the incumbent’s
marginal cost so that the incumbent sometimes optimally chooses to sell
access at a loss.
We next draw a comparison between regulated and unregulated mar-
kets using two different efficiency criteria: social welfare measured by total
surplus and technological efficiency. We consider a regulator setting access
charges but leaving the retail market and the entrant’s option between access
and bypass unregulated. If access is chosen, the regulator wants to decrease
the access charge with respect to the unregulated incumbent’s choice in
order to lower the retail prices paid by consumers. In addition, the regula-
5The Belgian regulators impose mandatory third-party access to the cable-TV network,
the Canadian regulators have recently imposed regulated access for optical fibre networks.
6The analogy between bypass and entry deterrence, while useful, is not complete. The
model of competition with access is more complex than a simple model of competition
because of the interactions between the access and retail markets. Existing results on
entry deterrence cannot be directly applied to bypass deterrence.
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tor wants to induce more access than in an unregulated market. There is
thus excessive bypass from a welfare point of view when the access charge is
unregulated. The analysis of technological efficiency leads to a different con-
clusion. Reproducing Mandy’s (2009) analysis – but with a positive fixed
cost of bypass – we show that the make or buy decision depends on the
level of the access charge and may be inefficient. When bypass is chosen, it
is always efficient, but access may be chosen even when bypass is cheaper.
There is thus excessive access from a technological point of view.7
The choice between service-based and facility-based competition has al-
ready been studied in previous papers. In a static setting, Sappington (2005)
demonstrates the irrelevance of the access charge for the choice between
service- and facility-based competition and shows that the most efficient
mode of competition always emerges in an unregulated market. The en-
trant develops its own infrastructure only if he can provide the network
input more efficiently than the incumbent. Sappington’s argument is ob-
tained assuming a Hotelling model with a fully-covered market. Gayle and
Weisman (2007) demonstrate that, in more general settings, the access price
matters for the choice of a mode of competition. Mandy (2009) identifies a
set of access prices that induce productive efficiency which includes pricing
access at the incumbent’s or at the entrant’s marginal cost. In dynamic
models, facility-based competition is often considered as a long-term ob-
jective. The question then is to know whether allowing for service-based
competition accelerates the development of facility based competition (the
so-called stepping-stone effect identified by Cave and Vogelsang, 2003) or
delays the installation of new infrastructure (Bourreau and Dog˜an, 2005).8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model
7Mandy (2009) shows that in the absence of fixed cost the make or buy decision of the
entrant is technologically efficient for a broad range of access charges.
8For Cave and Vogelsang (2003), service-based competition allows newcomers in the
industry to invest progressively in their own infrastructure, first in replicable assets (e.g.,
long-distance conveyance facility) then in less replicable ones (e.g., local loop). When
there are ladders of investment, leasing part of the existing infrastructure is then essential
for the development of facility-based competition. Accordingly, a low access charge ac-
celerates the deployment of alternative infrastructures. For Bourreau and Dog˜an (2005),
allowing for access delays investment in competing infrastructures because the cost of a
new infrastructure includes an opportunity cost equal to the profit realized under service-
based competition (an effect that is similar to the replacement effect in innovation races).
Following that, a lower access price increases the opportunity cost of bypass and should
delay further infrastructure building. In an international study using a sample of OECD
countries, Bouckaert, van Dijk and Verboven (2010) found that mandatory access to the
incumbent DSL networks negatively affects the incentives to invest in alternative broad-
band networks.
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of competition with access in the next Section and the retail price game in
Section 3. We characterize the profit maximizing behavior of the unregulated
incumbent in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss efficiency and regulation,
analyzing the optimal behavior of a regulator maximizing social welfare.
In Section 6, we analyze the technological efficiency of the entrant’s make
or buy decision. We conclude and discuss possible extensions in Section
7. Proofs of the results which are not given in the text are collected in
Appendix A.
2 The model
We analyze price competition between two firms: a vertically integrated in-
cumbent, firm 1, and an entrant, firm 2. To produce for the retail market,
firms need a network input. The incumbent has already installed the net-
work at cost f1 and can produce one unit of network input at a constant
marginal cost c1. Firm 2 has no installed network. To produce, it has two
options: access or bypass. The entrant either buys access to firm 1’s network
at unit price w or it installs its own network infrastructure at a fixed cost
f2 and produces the network input at a constant marginal cost c2.
On the retail market, the demand for product supplied by firm i = 1, 2 at
prices (pi, pj) is given by qi(pi, pj). Products are imperfect substitutes and
we represent the demand by the following system of linear demand functions:
qi(pi, pj) = 1− pi + δpj , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, δ < 1. (1)
The parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) is the displacement ratio which indicates how an in-
crease in the price of good j raises the demand of good i. The linear demand
function can be derived from the maximizing behavior of a representative
consumer with net surplus function
V ≡ U(q1, q2)− p1q1 − p2q2,
where U is the quadratic function9
U =
(1 + δ)




2(1− δ2) − δ
q1q2
(1− δ2) .
9Notice that δ cannot be strictly interpreted as a parameter of product differentiation
in the utility function, as utility explodes to +∞ or −∞ when δ goes to 1.
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In order to guarantee that a monopolist makes positive profits if mar-
kets are independent, we restrict the set of admissible cost parameters to
c1 ∈ [0, 1]. We also suppose for simplicity that the two firms have identical
retail costs that we normalize to zero.10 Hence a market in our model is
characterized by the five parameters c1, f1, c2, f2 and δ. We now compute
the profits of the incumbent and the entrant and the welfare.
When firm 2 chooses the access option, the incumbent sells two products:
the retail good 1 at price p1 and access to its network at price w. Both goods
are produced at unit cost c1 and the firms’ profits are given by:
pia1(p1, p2) = (p1 − c1)q1 + (w − c1)q2 − f1, (2)
pia2(p2, p1) = (p2 − w)q2. (3)
Welfare is measured by total surplus, with equal weights on consumer and
producer surplus:
W a = U(q1, q2)− c1q1 − c1q2 − f1.
When firm 2 chooses the bypass option, each firm sells a single product
and the profits are given by:
pib1(p1, p2) = (p1 − c1)q1 − f1, (4)
pib2(p2, p1) = (p2 − c2)q2 − f2. (5)
and welfare under bypass is given by:
W b = U(q1, q2)− c1q1 − c2q2 − (f1 + f2).
The timing of the model is as follows. In the first stage, the access price
w is chosen – either by the incumbent firm in an unregulated market or
by a regulator maximizing welfare. In the second stage, after observing the
access price w, the entrant chooses between infrastructure-based competition
(bypass) and service-based competition (access). In the third stage, both
firms simultaneously choose the retail prices p1 and p2.
Our model is similar to the standard model analyzed by Sappington
(2005), Gayle and Weisman (2007) and Mandy (2009), except for two im-
portant differences. First, we allow for fixed network costs fi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2.
10Allowing for different retail costs would introduce an additional dimension of hetero-
geneity of the model, greatly complicating the computations with little additional insight.
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In our analysis, fixed costs play an asymmetric role. For the incumbent,
the fixed cost is sunk at the time decisions are made while the entrant must
incur the fixed cost only if he chooses bypass. Second, we endogenize the
choice of the access charge w by an unregulated firm or by the regulator.
3 Retail price competition
We solve the game by backward induction, starting with the optimal re-
tail prices under access and bypass. We will denote the equilibrium prices
charged by firm i = 1, 2 under access (k = a) and bypass (k = b) by p˜ki ,











j ). Equilibrium profits are a function of the input cost of the
entrant. Let us denote this input cost by x, with x equal to the access charge
w under access and the marginal cost c2 under bypass. Abusing notations,
we let p˜ki (x) and p˜i
k
i (x) denote equilibrium prices and profits as a function
of the entrant’s input cost.
3.1 Competition under access
Suppose that the entrant has chosen to buy access at price w. At the price





(p1 − c1) + ∂q2
∂p1




(p2 − w) = 0. (7)
In the linear model, best response functions are linear, and equilibrium
prices are uniquely determined by the solution to a system of two linear equa-
tions.11 Equilibrium prices p˜a1 and p˜
a
2 are increasing in the access charge w.
In addition to the classical positive effect of an increase in the marginal cost
of the entrant on equilibrium prices, an increase in w increases the margin
on the access market, prompting the incumbent firm to increase its price
in order to increase the demand of the entrant on the access market (Chen
(2001) refers to this effect as the “collusive effect”in the context of vertical
mergers). As both prices increase simultaneously, the effect of an increase
in the access price on equilibrium quantities is unclear. On the one hand,
11The exact computations for the linear model involve tedious expressions and are de-
ferred to the Appendix which contains all explicit formulae.
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an increase in the access charge increases the own price, reducing quanti-
ties (the direct effect) ; on the other hand, an increase in the access charge
increases the entrant’s price, increasing quantities (the indirect effect). We
observe that in the linear model, the direct effect dominates the indirect
effect so that an increase in w lowers both equilibrium quantities q˜a1 and q˜
a
2 .
From of the point of view of the entrant, an increase in w is similar to
an increase in marginal cost, resulting in a decrease on equilibrium profit.
From the point of view of the incumbent, the effect of an increase in w
on equilibrium profit is ambiguous. On the one hand, an increase in the
access charge amounts to an increase in the rival firm’s cost, increasing the
incumbent’s profit on the product market. On the other hand, an increase
in w reduces quantities sold in the access market, possibly reducing revenues
in the access market. In the linear model, we observe that the incumbent’s
profit is quadratic, and hence strictly concave, in the access charge w. It




We note that the optimal access charge for the incumbent, w∗, is always
larger than the incumbent’s marginal cost c1. The intuition is that, for
w < c1, as the incumbent makes losses on the access market, raising the
access charge only has positive effects – it softens competition on the retail
market and reduces losses on the access market. Hence the incumbent’s
profit is always increasing in the access charge when w < c1.
3.2 Competition under bypass
We now turn to retail price competition under bypass. Suppose that the
entrant has chosen to build its own infrastructure. The equilibrium prices








(p2 − c2) = 0. (9)
In the linear model, the equilibrium prices are unique and given by the
solution to a system of linear equations. The comparative statics effects of
changes in costs are standard: an increase in the marginal cost ci results in an
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increase in both equilibrium prices, a reduction in the equilibrium quantity
q˜bi sold by firm i but an increase in the quantity sold by its competitor q˜
b
j ,
a reduction in the profit of firm i p˜ibi but an increase in the profit of its
competitor p˜ibj .
4 Strategic bypass deterrence
We now consider the second stage of the game in which the entrant
chooses between bypass and access. The entrant’s “make-or-buy”decision
depends on the comparison between the access and bypass profits p˜ia2(w)
and p˜ib2(c2). We will start our analysis by defining an access charge ω
l(x)
such that an entrant with a marginal cost x = c2 is indifferent between
buying access at ωl(x) and bypass at cost x. By analogy with the literature
on entry deterrence, we call ωl(x) the limit access charge. This limit access
charge is defined as:
p˜ia2(ω
l(x)) = p˜ib2(x). (10)
Because the profit pib2 is decreasing in the costs c2 and f2, the limit access
charge is increasing in the entrant’s marginal and fixed costs c2 and f2. As
p˜ia2(w) is increasing in w, the entrant will choose access if the access charge
is below the limit access charge and bypass if it is above. The discussion in
this section is organized around this question: is the optimal access charge
selected by the incumbent above or below the limit access charge? To con-
duct our analysis of the optimal access charge, we will assume the following:
First, the entrant prefers access to bypass if access is free: p˜ia2(0) > p˜i
b
2(c2).
This assumption guarantees that the limit access charge is uniquely defined.
Second, the entrant prefers bypass to access when both options have a zero
marginal cost: p˜ia2(0) < p˜i
b
2(0). That is, the entrant’s fixed cost under bypass
is not so large that it offsets the tendency for the incumbent to charge a
lower price under access because of losses from the sales of access. Third,
the entrant’s bypass option constraints the incumbent’s access pricing when
the firms’ marginal costs are equal: ωl(c1) < w
∗.
We start by comparing the equilibrium prices and profits under access
and bypass for a fixed input cost x.
Lemma 1 If x < c1, equilibrium prices and gross profits are higher under
bypass than under access: p˜bi(x) > p˜
a





p˜ib2(x) + f2 > p˜i
a
2(x). If w
∗ ≥ x > c1, equilibrium prices and gross profits are
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higher under access than under bypass and if x = c1, equilibrium prices and
gross profits are equal under access and bypass.
Lemma 1 is a fundamental result which will be used repeatedly in the
analysis. Lemma 1 shows that the ranking of the two re´gimes of access
and bypass is the same for the incumbent and for the entrant, up to the
fixed cost f2 (at this stage, the fixed cost f1 is sunk and plays no role in the
comparisons). If the input cost x is lower than the incumbent’s marginal cost
c1, equilibrium prices and profits are higher under bypass than under access.
If the input cost x is higher than the incumbent’s marginal cost, equilibrium
prices and profits are higher under access than under bypass. The intuition
underlying Lemma 1 is easily understood. For a given input cost x, the best
response function of the entrant is identical under access and bypass, but
not the incumbent’s. Under access, an increase in the price p1 generates
an additional effect due to the presence of the access market, dq2dp1 (x− c1).12
If x < c1, this effect is negative: the incumbent has an incentive to lower
prices in order to reduce the quantity of the entrant, so that equilibrium
prices are reduced, and the two firms price more aggressively, leading to
lower gross profits. If x > c1, this effect is positive: the incumbent raises his
price to increase the quantity of its entrant, equilibrium prices are increased
and softer competition results in higher gross profits.
4.1 Equivalent access charges
We now compute the value of the access price which makes the incumbent
indifferent between access and bypass and we call it the equivalent access
charge ωe. Recall that p˜ia1(w) is strictly increasing when w ≤ w∗. By Lemma




1(0). Furthermore because the incumbent’s
equilibrium profit under bypass is increasing in the entrant’s marginal cost,
p˜ib1(0) < p˜i
b




1(c2). Now by optimality of the access
charge w∗, p˜ia1(w∗) ≥ max{p˜ia1(c1), p˜ia1(c2)}. If c2 > c1, by Lemma 1, p˜ia1(c2) >
p˜ib1(c2) so that p˜i
a
1(w
∗) > p˜ib1(c2). If c1 > c2, by Lemma 1, p˜ia1(c1) = p˜ib1(c1)
and because the equilibrium profit of the incumbent is increasing in the
marginal cost of the entrant, p˜ib1(c1) > p˜i
b




We conclude that there is a unique access charge ωe(x) in (0, w∗) such that:
p˜ia1(ω
e(x)) = p˜ib1(x). (11)
12Sappington (2005) labels this effect the opportunity cost of access.
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We call ωe the equivalent access charge. As both p˜ia1(x) and p˜i
b
1(x) are in-
creasing in x for x ≤ w∗, the equivalent access charge ωe is increasing in
c2.
Figure 1 displays the profit of the incumbent as a function of the en-
trant’s unit cost x. It displays the optimal access charge w∗ and shows the
construction of the equivalent access charge ωe for a fixed value of the en-
trant’s cost c2. In the figure, we have placed c2 below c1 in which case, the
equivalent access charge belongs to we ∈ [c2, c1]. If c2 > c1, then we would









Figure 1: Incumbent’s profit under bypass and access
4.2 Limit access charges
The entrant’s equilibrium profits under access and bypass satisfy an impor-
tant regulatory property stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The difference between the entrant’s profit under access and by-
pass, p˜ia2(x)− p˜ib2(x), is increasing in the entrant’s input cost x.
By Lemma 1, p˜ia2(c1)−p˜ib2(c1) = f2 > 0. By assumption, p˜ia2(0)−p˜ib2(0) < 0,
11
Lemma 2 guarantees that there exists a unique value of the entrant’s input




Figure 2 displays the gross and net profit of the entrant under bypass
and access as a function of the entrant’s cost x. It highlights the role of c1
and c∗ and shows the construction of the limit access price ωl for any value
of the incumbent’s marginal cost c2. On the figure, we have represented the
case of c2 < c
∗ < c1. Notice that the limit access price ωl is smaller than c2











Figure 2: Entrant’s profit under bypass and access
Finally, we can establish a lemma on the regularity of the incumbent’s
profit, this lemma will be useful to characterize the optimal access charge.
Lemma 3 The difference between the incumbent’s profit under access at the
limit access charge ωl and under bypass, p˜ia1(ω
l(x))− p˜ib1(x), is increasing in
the entrant’s input cost x as long as ωl(x) < c1.
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4.3 Optimal access charge
We now make use of the limit and equivalent access charges, ωl and ωe
to characterize the profit maximizing behavior of the incumbent in the first
stage of the game. If ωl ≥ w∗, the incumbent blocks bypass by selecting his
profit-maximizing access charge w∗: this is the re´gime of blockaded bypass.
If w∗ ≥ ωl ≥ ωe, by selecting the limit access charge ωl, the incumbent
obtains a higher profit than under bypass: this is the re´gime of deterred
bypass.13 Finally, if ωe ≥ ωl, the incumbent prefers to accept bypass: this
is the re´gime of accommodated bypass.
The preceding discussion describes the emergence of the three possible
re´gimes of accommodated bypass, deterred bypass and blockaded bypass as
a function of the endogenous variables w∗, ωe and ωl. In the next step of
the analysis, we delineate the regions of parameters under which the three
re´gimes arise. Our discussion focuses on the marginal cost c2 of the entrant.
We identify two thresholds value for c2 –called c
D and cB– that separate the
three re´gimes.
Notice that as c∗ < c1, by Lemma 1, the incumbent prefers bypass to
access at c∗: p˜ia1(c∗) < p˜ib1(c∗) and recall that ωl(c∗) = c∗ so that p˜ia1(ωl(c∗)) <
p˜ib1(c
∗). Next note that by Lemma 1, at c1, p˜ia1(c1) = p˜ib1(c1). Furthermore
ωl(c1) > c1 as c1 > c
∗. As the profit of the incumbent is increasing in
the access charge when x < w∗, and we assume that the limit access charge
ωl(c1) is smaller than w
∗, p˜ia1(c1) < p˜ia1(ωl(c1)) and hence p˜ia1(ωl(c1)) > p˜ib1(c1).
Lemma 3 implies that there is a unique threshold value cD ∈ (c∗, c1) of the




The incumbent chooses to accommodate bypass when c < cD and to deter
bypass when c ≥ cD. Blockaded bypass occurs whenever the optimal access
charge w∗ is lower than the limit access charge, namely whenever ωl(c2) ≥




We summarize our findings in the following Proposition:
13In our model, there is a commitment to the access charge which is set prior to the
decision of the entrant on whether to bypass the incumbent’s network. Absent this com-
mitment, the incumbent would have incentives to raise the access price (to w∗) after access
has been chosen by the entrant. Commitment to the access price is thus essential for the
existence of the bypass deterrence re´gime.
13
Proposition 1 There exists cD and cB, with c∗ ≤ cD ≤ c1 ≤ cB, such
that the incumbent sets the access charge ω as follows. If c2 ≤ cD, bypass
occurs. If cD ≤ c2 ≤ cB, the incumbent sets the limit access charge ωl to
deter bypass. If c2 ≥ cB, the incumbent sets the access charge w∗ and bypass
is blocked.
Proposition 1 characterizes the profit maximizing behavior of the incum-
bent as a function of the entrant’s unit cost. When c2 > c1, both firms prefer
access to bypass. When c2 ≤ c∗ < c1, the limit access charge is lower than
the entrant’s marginal cost, so that the incumbent prefers to allow bypass
at c2 than access at ω
l. When the entrant’s unit cost lies in the intermediate
region (c∗, c1), the choice between access and bypass is ambiguous because,
on the one hand, as ωl > c2 access makes the entrant softer in the retail pric-
ing game, but on the other hand, when ωl < c1 access makes the incumbent
more aggressive in the retail pricing game. There is then a unique threshold
value of the cost, cD, which separates the access and bypass regions. Notice
that, in the region of unit costs [cD, c1], when the cost is close to c
D, the
incumbent may prefer to sell access at a price ωl < c1 There is a region of
costs where the incumbent prefers to encourage access at a loss rather than
face competition by a rival who installs his own network.14 We illustrate the










Figure 3: Optimal access charge and the three regimes
The fixed costs f1 and f2 play an asymmetric role in the analysis. At
the pricing stage, the fixed cost of the incumbent is sunk and does not affect
the equilibrium analysis. On the other hand, the fixed cost of the entrant
affects the limit access price ωl. As f2 increases, ω
l increases, reducing
cD and hence the region of parameters for which bypass is chosen by the
incumbent.
14Vickers (1995) was the first to identify that an access price below the induced cost
might be optimal, in his case to curb the entrant’s market power.
14
The exact expressions of the thresholds cD and cB are complex and we
only provide a numerical illustration. We compute the thresholds using the
following parameters: c1 = 0.5 and δ =
1
2 . Table 1 reports the threshold








Table 1: Boundaries of the three regions
In the special case where f2 = 0, Lemma 1 immediately establishes that
c∗ = cD = c1. This is the situation analyzed by Mandy (2009) who observes
that, for any exogenous access charge w ∈ [min{c1, c2},max{c1, c2}], the
make-or-buy decision of the entrant is technologically efficient. This result
is a direct consequence of the equality c∗ = c1. If c2 < c∗ = c1, the entrant
efficiently chooses bypass at c2 and for any access charge c2 ≤ w. If c∗ =
c1 < c2, the entrant efficiently chooses access at c2 and for any w ≤ c2.
Proposition 1 shows that, similarly, an unregulated incumbent will always
encourage access when c1 < c2 and bypass when c2 < c1, leading to a
technically efficient choice. In Section 6, we show that this conclusion only
holds for the special case where f2 = 0.
5 Welfare and regulation
We next consider the optimal access charge chosen by a regulator maximizing
social welfare. We assume that the social planner can select the access charge
w but cannot choose retail prices nor decide on the make-or-buy choice of
the entrant.
5.1 Optimal access charge regulation
15These values guarantee a positive profit for firm 1 if we assume that f1 = f2.
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Under access, the problem of the regulator is:
[R1] = max
w
W a subject to:
p˜ia1(w) ≥ 0,
w ≤ ωl.
The welfare maximizing access charge must satisfy two constraints. First,
the access provider should cover its fixed cost and make a non-negative profit.
Second, the access charge must be such that the entrant effectively chooses
to buy access. The first constraint is equivalent to w ≥ ω0, where ω0 is the
smaller root of the quadratic equation:
p˜ia1(ω0) = 0.
So the welfare maximization problem [R1] has a solution only if the param-
eters of the model satisfy: ω0 ≤ ωl.
In the linear model, it is easy to check that welfare is a quadratic, strictly
concave function of the access charge w, so that we can define the socially




Contrary to the profit maximizing access charge w∗, the socially optimal
access charge wˆ is always smaller than the incumbent’s unit cost c1 because
such an access charge is an artificially low marginal cost in the retail pricing
subgame and therefore induces the firms to price closer to true marginal cost
in equilibrium.16
In the linear model, the socially optimal access charge wˆ is too low to
guarantee positive profit to the incumbent even when the incumbent has a
zero fixed cost. Therefore the solution to [R1] is to set the access charge
at the lowest possible level compatible compatible with a positive profit for
the incumbent, ω0, and the problem admits a solution only if ω
l ≥ ω0.
Given that ωl(·) is increasing in c2 and ω0 is independent of c2, as long as
p˜ia1(ω
l(0)) < 0, there exists a unique threshold value of the marginal cost of
the entrant, cW such that
ωl(cW ) = ω0 (15)
16However, with a negative margin on access, the incumbent may resist the imposition of
the access charge wˆ and resort to sabotage in order to protect its profit on the downstream
market.
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Access is only possible if c2 ≥ cW . Notice that, as ω0 is increasing in
f1, the threshold value c
W is increasing in f1. For higher values of the
incumbent’s fixed cost, the region of marginal costs of the entrant for which
access can be chosen is reduced.
5.2 Regulated access or bypass
We next compare the welfare under access at ω0 and under bypass. We first
note that welfare under bypass W b(c2) is decreasing in c2. An increase in the
marginal cost of the entrant results in three effects: it increases consumer
prices leading to a decrease in consumer surplus, reduces the entrant’s profit
and increases the incumbent’s profit. In the linear model, the first two effects
dominate the last, so that welfare under bypass is decreasing in c2. Hence,
as long as W a(ω0) < W
b(0), there exists a unique value of the entrant’s
marginal cost, cI , for which welfare under access and bypass are equal,
W a(ω0) = W
b(cI). (16)
Notice that W b(·) and W a(·) are decreasing functions for x > wˆ. Hence
an increase in f1, resulting in an increase in ω0 will raise the value of the
threshold level cI . We now characterize the optimal behavior of the regu-
lator. Two cases need to be distinguished: if cW ≤ cI , the threshold value
separating access and bypass is cI . The regulator prefers to encourage
bypass whenever c2 < c
I . If c2 > c
I ≥ cW , the regulator prefers to induce
access and sets an access charge at ω0 < ω
l(c2) If on the other hand c
I < cW ,
the regulator cannot induce access when cI < c2 < c
W , so he chooses to al-
low bypass whenever c2 < c
W and to promote access when c2 ≥ cW . We
summarize this finding in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 The regulator sets the access charge w as follows. For
c2 < Max[c
W , cI ], the regulator chooses bypass. For c2 ≥ Max[cW , cI ],
the regulator chooses to induce access and sets the access charge at ω0.
As opposed to the case of the unregulated incumbent, the incumbent’s
fixed cost plays a role in the choice between access and bypass under regu-
lation. A higher fixed cost f1 results in an increase in c
W and cI and hence
reduces the region of parameters for which the regulator chooses access.
We finally compare the make-or-buy decisions under regulation and for
an unregulated incumbent by comparing the threshold values cD, cI and cW .
This requires a comparison of the values of consumer surplus under access
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and bypass. Contrary to the firms’ profits, the difference in consumer surplus
under access and bypass is not easy to sign. We obtain a clear ranking of
consumer surplus only when the fixed cost f2 is sufficiently small.
To establish this result, we suppose that access at ω = c1 is profitable for
the incumbent. Because p˜ia1(ω0) = 0 < p˜i
a
1(c1) and ω0 < w
∗, we necessarily
have wˆ < ω0 < c1. The access price at which the profit of the incumbent
vanishes must be smaller than the incumbent’s marginal cost but is larger
than the welfare maximizing access charge. But as W a(x) is strictly concave,
this implies that W a(ω0) > W
a(c1). Now when f2 is small, c
D converges
to c1, and prices and profit at c1 are equal under access and bypass, so




cI < cD. Furthermore, as ω0 < c1 and ω
l(cD) converges to ωe(c1) and c1,
we also have cW < cD. Hence, we obtain:
Proposition 3 For all c2 < c1, there exists f > 0 such that, whenever
f2 ≤ f , cW < cD and cI < cD.
Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that an unregulated incumbent sets an
excessive access charge inducing the entrant to bypass too often with respect
to the social optimum. The regulator sets an optimal access charge below
the unregulated access charge and encourages access for a broader range
of the entrant’s unit cost. In the absence of regulation, there is excessive
bypass by the entrant.17
Proposition 1 shows that the incumbent may decrease its access charge
below the optimal level to deter bypass. Proposition 2 shows that the social
planner finds it optimal to decrease the access charge even further, some-
times selling access at a loss to stimulate retail competition. However, notice
that our analysis ignores the explicit and implicit costs of regulation. Reg-
ulating the access price may be costly in terms of regulatory resources, and
also result in uncertainty when the firms’ regulatory environment changes
over time. Introducing costs of regulation would make the regulatory re´gime
less likely and hence increase the probability of excessive bypass.
Table 2 reports the results of a numerical simulation using the parameter
values: c1 = 0.5 and δ =
1
2 and considering equal fixed costs f1 = f2. It
illustrates Proposition 3 and shows that for low values of the fixed cost, there
is excessive bypass when the market is not regulated. However, this effect
is only obtained for low values of the fixed cost, and the result is reversed
and excessive access arises when the fixed cost becomes large.
17Bloch and Gautier (2008) found the same result in a different model where the regu-




0 0.22 0.40 excessive bypass: cI < cD
0.05 0.19 0.35 excessive bypass
0.10 0.15 0.30 excessive access: cD < cI
0.15 0.12 0.25 excessive access
Table 2: Access and bypass in the regulated re´gime
6 Technological efficiency
Mandy (2009) demonstrates that in the absence of fixed costs, for any access
charge w in the interval [min{c1, c2},max{c1, c2}], the entrant chooses the
technologically efficient option. We revisit this question for positive values
of the fixed cost.18 In the presence of a fixed cost, technological efficiency
does not only depend on the unit production costs but also on the total
production level: access may be technologically efficient for low production
levels and bypass technologically efficient for high production levels. As
the incumbent’s technology does not change under bypass, his production
does not directly enter the computations. We define technical efficiency as
follows.
Definition 1 Fix c1, c2 and w. We say that bypass is technologically effi-
cient if the cost of producing q˜b2(c2) is lower under bypass than access:
c2q˜
b
2(c2) + f2 < c1q˜
b
2(c2).
We say that access is technologically efficient if the cost of producing q˜a2(w)






Given this definition, we cannot partition the set of costs into two exclu-
sive regions – one where bypass is efficient and one where access is efficient.
There may exist unit costs and access charges for which both access and
bypass (or neither) are technologically efficient.
Consider the entrant’s optimal make-or-buy decision under a fixed access
charge w ∈ [min{c1, c2},max{c1, c2}]. If c1 < c2, then c1 ≤ w ≤ c2 and
18For simplicity, we consider the same range of access charges as Mandy (2009). However
our analysis also extends to the optimal access charges set by the incumbent and the






2(w), so that the entrant always chooses access which is
clearly the best technological option.
If, on the other hand, c2 < c1, the discussion becomes more complex.




The function κ(w) assigns to each access charge w the value of the
marginal cost c2 which makes the entrant indifferent between access and
bypass. (The function κ(w) is the inverse of the strictly increasing mapping
ωl(c2).) By definition, κ(c
∗) = c∗. Let cA denote the entrant’s unit cost
which makes him indifferent between buying access at c1 or building his
own network, cA = κ(c1). For any w ∈ [c∗, c1], because κ(w) is a strictly
increasing function, c∗ = κ(c∗) ≤ κ(w) ≤ cA = κ(c1).
We now observe that the threshold value cD is smaller than cA. First
note that p˜ia1(ω
l(κ(c1)) ≡ p˜ia1(c1) = p˜ib1(c1). Furthermore, as κ(c1) ≤ c1,
p˜ib1(c1) ≥ p˜ib1(κ(c1)). Hence,
p˜ia1(ω
l(κ(c1))− p˜ib1(κ(c1)) ≥ 0,
which under Lemma 2 shows that cD ≤ κ(c1) = cA.
In the next step, we argue that when c2 = c
A, bypass is technologically
efficient. To check this, recall that p˜ia2(c1) = p˜i
b
2(c1) + f2 so that
p˜ib2(c
A)− p˜ia2(c1) = p˜ib2(cA)− p˜ib2(c1)− f2 ≤ p˜ib2(cA)− p˜ib2(c1).
We now compute the difference in the profit of the entrant at bypass
under cA and c1:
p˜ib2(c

















< (c1 − cA)qb2(cA),
where the last inequality is due to the fact that, as prices are strategic
complements, ∂p1∂p2 > 0 and as q˜
b
2 is decreasing in c, q˜
b
2(c
A) ≥ q˜b2(c) for all
c > cA. Hence
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(c1 − cA)q˜b2(cA) > p˜ib2(cA)− p˜ia2(c1) = 0,
so that bypass is technologically efficient at cA. Furthermore, as q˜b2 is de-
creasing in c2, bypass will remain technologically efficient for any c2 < c
A.
The following Proposition summarizes our discussion.
Proposition 4 Consider any access charge w ∈ [min{c1, c2},max{c1, c2}].
For any c2 > c1, access is chosen by the entrant and is technologically ef-
ficient. For any c2 < c1, whenever bypass is chosen by the entrant, it is
technologically efficient.
Proposition 4 shows that when the unit cost of the entrant is greater than
the unit cost of the incumbent, access is always chosen by the incumbent
and is technologically efficient. When the unit cost of the entrant is lower
than the unit cost of the incumbent and the entrant chooses bypass, bypass
is technologically efficient. This result does not rule out the possibility
that, when c2 < c1, the entrant chooses access when bypass would have
been technologically efficient. In fact, the following example shows that this
possibility can occur. Let δ approach 1 and assume that the access charge is
equal to the unit cost of the entrant, w = c2. We know from Section 4.3 that
c∗ = c1 − 3(
√
1 + f2 − 1) < c1 where we assume f2 < 3 to obtain a positive
value for c∗. We compute qa2 = 1. Hence access is technologically efficient at
c∗ if and only if c1 < c1−3(
√
1 + f2−1)+f2 which can only be true if f2 > 3
in contradiction with our assumption on the fixed cost. We conclude that
there exists  > 0 such that for values c2 = c1 − 3(
√
1 + f2 − 1) + , access
occurs at equilibrium but is technologically inefficient. This example shows
that an unregulated market does not necessarily lead to a technologically
efficient outcome in a model with positive fixed costs.
7 Conclusion
In liberalized network industries, the wholesale price paid by a new competi-
tor for using the existing infrastructure is a key determinant of the choice
between access and bypass as it determines both the entrant’s input cost and
the intensity of retail price competition. This paper characterizes the profit
maximizing behavior of an unregulated incumbent and compares regulated
and unregulated re´gimes.
By analogy to the literature on strategic entry deterrence, we distin-
guish three re´gimes of blockaded bypass, deterred bypass and accommodated
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bypass depending on the entrant’s unit cost. The unregulated incumbent
chooses excessive access charges inducing excessive bypass by the entrant.
The make-or-buy decision of the entrant is not necessarily technologically
efficient: when bypass is chosen, it is always the cheapest option but access
may be chosen when it is not cost effective.
Our analysis provides an exhaustive picture of the behavior of an un-
regulated incumbent in a network industry, showing the tension between al-
locative and productive efficiency when alternative infrastructures are viable
but not necessarily more efficient. These tensions originate in the softening
of competition effect under access when the incumbent manages to realize
a positive margin on access. In conclusion, we would like to point out three
restrictions of the model that deserve attention for future research.
As noted by Nardotto, Valletti and Verboven (2015), the creation of
a new network is often associated with an increase in the quality of the
service. In this case, the characterization of the profit-maximizing access
charge chosen by the incumbent is more complicated because two opposite
effects are at play. On the one hand, because bypass is more attractive for
the entrant, the limit access charge decreases, making access more costly
to the incumbent. On the other hand by allowing bypass, the incumbent
is harmed by the difference in qualities between the two services, making
bypass less attractive. An increase in the quality of service under bypass
thus produces ambiguous effects on the incumbent’s incentive to accept or
deter bypass. It would also be of interest to check whether the welfare
comparisons between regulated and unregulated markets continue to hold if
we consider next generation networks.19 Likewise, we considered that the
construction of the entrant’s network has no effect on how the incumbent
builds out or replaces its network. It would be interesting to depart from
this assumption and consider that the incumbent might cut back on network
upgrades or expansion if part of the capacity in the market was provided
by the entrant. In some cases, this takes the form of the incumbent no
longer having a duty to serve - hence, it may not require the same network
capacity it did previously. In the limit, the incumbent’s fixed cost f1 might
simply represent capacity that need no longer be required of the incumbent,
particularly in a two-way access framework, which is not modeled here.
The model considered a single competitor. An alternative view would
be to consider multiple competitors, possibly with different costs. In this
case, suppose that the competitors massively buy access to develop service-
based competition. Competition then would erode retail margins and give
19Avenali, Matteucci and Reverberi (2009); Bourreau, Dog˜an and Manant (2010).
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the incumbent an incentive to focus on the access market. A complete
analysis of this model with competition among competitors remains to be
undertaken.
Last, we could also consider multiple incumbents competing to provide
access to competitors. Indeed, wholesale broadband access markets are be-
coming more and more competitive with alternative providers that could
possibly sell access to competitors. It would be interesting to extend the
analysis to take into account competition at both the access and the retail
level between incumbents and competitors.
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A The linear model
In this appendix, we use the linear demand functions defined in Equation (1)
to derive the explicit functional forms for the equilibrium prices, quantities
and profits and to check our comparative static results. Lemmas are proven
using these explicit formulae. The linear model allows us to derive the
thresholds for the access charge ωe and ωl and for the cost cD, cB, cW and
cI as they are the solution to second degree equations. These expressions
are used for our numerical simulations reproduced in Tables 1 and 2.
Equilibrium prices and quantities under access Profits under access
are defined as:
pia1(p1, p2, w) = (p1 − c1)(1− p1 + δp2) + (w − c1)(1− p2 + δp1)− f1,
pia2(p1, p2, w) = (p2 − w)(1− p2 + δp1).
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From the profit functions, we can derive the unique equilibrium prices and


























4− δ2 c1 −
2(1− δ2))
4− δ2 w.
It is straightforward to check that equilibrium prices are increasing in w and
the corresponding equilibrium quantities are decreasing. The equilibrium
profits are given by:
p˜ia1 =
[2− c1(2 + 2δ − δ2) + δ + 3wδ][2 + δ − δw(1− δ2)− c1(1− δ)(2− δ2)]
(4− δ2)2
+
[(w − c1)(4− δ2)][2 + δ + c1δ(1− δ)− 2w(1− δ2)]
(4− δ2)2 ,
p˜ia2 =
(2 + δ + δ(1− δ)c1 − 2(1− δ2)w)2
(4− δ2)2 .
The profit functions are quadratic in w, p˜ia1 is concave in w and
∂p˜ia2
∂w < 0.
The profit maximizing access charge w∗ is defined as:
w∗ =
8 + δ3
2(1− δ)(8 + δ2) +
(1− δ)(8 + 2δ2 − δ3)
2(1− δ)(8 + δ2) c1 > c1.
Equilibrium prices and quantities under bypass Profits under by-
pass are defined as:
pib1(p1, p2) = (p1 − c1)(1− p1 + δp2)− f1,
pib2(p1, p2) = (p2 − c2)(1− p2 + δp1)− f2.
Solving for the linear demand model, equilibrium prices, quantities and































(2 + δ − (2− δ2)c1 + δc2)2
(4− δ2)2 − f1,
p˜ib2 =
(2 + δ − (2− δ2)c2 + δc1)2
(4− δ2)2 − f2.














Proof of Lemma 1 The proof of Lemma 1 can be easily done by replacing




i . Then, we have that:
p˜a1 − p˜b1 =
2δ
4− δ2 (c1 − x), p˜
a
2 − p˜b2 =
δ2
4− δ2 (c1 − x).
And the lemma is proven.
Limit and equivalent access charges Solving Equation (10), we find
the limit access charge ωl:
ωl =
2 + δ + c1δ(1− δ)−
√
(2 + δ − (2− δ2)c2 + δc1)2 − f2(4− δ2)2
2(1− δ2) .
And ωl is increasing in both c2 and f2. When the entrant has no fixed
cost (f2 = 0), then ω
l = c2(2−δ
2)−c1δ2
2(1−δ2) and it is easy to check that ω
l > c2 if
c2 > c1 and ω
l < c2 if c2 < c1. The equivalent access charge is the solution to
Equation (11) but it is not reproduced here as the expression is complicated
and has no value-added.
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4− δ2 [(2− δ)c1 − δx+ 2δ]
> 0.












∂x > 0 if and only if the function is positive when x = c1 and w˜2(x) = c1.









= −4δ(1− δ2)(2 + δ) + (2− δ2)(2 + δ)(2δ + δ3 + 1)
+ c1[1− 2(1− δ
2)(1 + δ2)
(2− δ2)
+ (2− δ2)(1− δ)(2 + 3δ − 4δ2 − 4δ3 + δ4)]
which is a linear function of c1 and is positive for all 0 < δ < 1 both at
c1 = 0 and at c1 = 1, showing that the lemma is satisfied.
Welfare and regulation






(4− δ2)2 [−(2 + δ)
2 − w(4 + 5δ2) + (8 + 2δ2 − δ3)c1].
We can thus identify an access charge wˆ that maximizes the welfare function
W a:
wˆ =
(8 + 2δ2 − δ3)c1 − (2 + δ)2
(4 + 5δ2)
< c1. (17)
However, the incumbent’s profit pia1(wˆ) is negative and the access charge wˆ
does not satisfy the constraint wˆ ≥ ω0 even for f1 = 0:
p˜ia1(ω0) = −




The welfare under bypass is decreasing in the entrant’s cost c2:
∂W b
∂c2
=
1
(4− δ2)2 [−(2+δ)(2−δ−δ
2)−2c1δ(2−δ2)+c2(δ2+(2−δ)2] < 0.
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